TECHNICAL NOTE N°. 8

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TRANSPORT POLICY PROCESSES

PARIS & ÎLE-DE-FRANCE REGION

CREATE PROJECT

Congestion Reduction in Europe, Advancing Transport Efficiency

TECHNICAL NOTE PREPARED BY:

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THE CREATE PROJECT IN BRIEF

Transport and mobility issues have increased in relevance on political agendas in parallel with the growing share of EU population living in cities, urban sprawl and climate change. In view of the negative effects of car use, there is a renewed interest about the role that transport should play in the sustainable city.


The CREATE project explores the Transport Policy Evolution Cycle. This model is a useful starting point for understanding how this evolution took place, and the lessons that we can learn for the future. Within the CREATE project, the study coordinated by the Sciences Po, CEE team (WP4) explores the historical evolution of transport policies and processes – from 'car-oriented' to 'planning for city life' – in five European cities (Berlin, Copenhagen, London, Paris, Vienna). Paying attention to case-specific contextual factors, policy instruments and programmes and involved stakeholders, this comparative analysis unveils the processes and the main drivers for change. This technical note concerns Paris and the Ile-de-France Region.



SUMMARY FINDINGS

When considering transport policy developments in both Paris and the Île-de-France region since the 1960s, competition emerges as the main driver for change: competition between levels of government, between political parties, between transport companies and between social and economic groups.

Yet competition has not led to inertia. Transport policies and governance underwent massive transformations in the context of two different dynamics: a state-led approach to mass-transit transportation, aimed at structuring regional growth through large scale transport infrastructures; and a city/region-led approach to urban/regional mobility planning, which prioritised small-scale interventions and non-motorized transport. Acknowledging the continued coexistence of both dynamics as well as their interplay over time contributes to the better understanding of transport policy developments and their spatial distribution.



Morphological zoning of the Paris Île-de-France region © IAU. D3.2 IDF report

Enhancing regional polycentrism through rapid transit infrastructures: State-led transport policy-making (1959-1977)

The region has experienced continued **demographic and economic growth since the 1960s**, mainly in the inner and outer suburbs, with an increased dependence on motorized transport. A series of state-led initiatives were launched under the De Gaulle presidency in order to contain urban sprawl and foster the emergence of new towns and business centres, such as the La Défense district. Spatial planning priorities were introduced in the 1965 planning document. Institutional reforms mainly aimed at side-lining the Parisian "red belt" and at **overcoming political fragmentation:** both Paris and the Region were placed under the direct control of the State, and five new towns were developed outside the urban core.

DID YOU KNOW? MAIN TRANSPORT MEASURES 1959-1977 Creation of a regional public transport authority Syndicat des transports parisiens (STP) 5 New Towns and new business centres (e.g. La Défense) Construction of motorways A1, A15 towards the west of Paris Paris ring-road (Boulevard périphérique) Planned urban motorways Paris Motorway Plan Regional Express Railways (RER)

H-shape, incl. two north-south routes,

serving city centre & suburban areas


Competing elite networks shared a similar interest in developing mass transport solutions - either motor- or rail-based - and using the capital-city region as a showcase for promoting them nationally and worldwide. Transport authorities and companies were reorganized under the leadership of the State, with the creation of powerful public-owned companies (SNCF for railways, RATP for public transport) and administrations (National Roads Directorate for car traffic). Massive investments were made in transport infrastructure throughout this period. For public transport, the Regional Express Railway (RER) network was jointly developed by RATP and SNCF from the 1960s onwards in order to address daily commuting travel demand to and from Paris. The largest share of investments favoured increasing road capacity. It was considered a preferred solution in order to reduce congestion, enable high-speed connections and accommodate transport demand. A large share of the proposed 900 km network was achieved by 1975, including radial routes between New towns (Mantes-la-Jolie, Cergy Pontoise) and towards Paris, the Parisian ring-road and the urban motorway alongside the Seine river.

Growing concerns were raised against such policy choices towards the end of the period. State-led urban and regional planning only had a limited impact on urban sprawl. Increased political competition slowed down implementation processes. A growing number of social and political organizations underlined the lack of investments in public transport and in Paris, they were joined by opponents to the proposed urban motorway plan.

The emergence of an urban transport agenda (1978-1997)

Decentralization reforms, environmental concerns and urban social movements accelerated the emergence of an urban transport agenda across the IDF Region. Transport was considered a priority for both local authorities, due to urban-specific issues (pollution, chronic underinvestment in public transport, congestion), and conservative elites at State level, due to rising political opposition from labour organizations and left of centre political parties. Significant policy resources were made available at State level for local authorities to develop innovative urban transport systems (e.g., a dedicated business tax - Versement Transport). Traffic mitigation measures were introduced in order to increase safety through traffic calming and urban design measures.

Yet implementation in the capital-city region was delayed: Paris and the Region had gained some autonomy, but the State retained considerable resources and powers. In this context, the largest share of capacity investments in the region still benefited rapid transit networks and car focused developments. Investments in the RER and metro networks were shaped by SNCF-RATP rivalry, preventing investments aimed at optimizing existing networks and the development of radial routes. Real-estate developers and the construction industry proposed new motorway developments in the wealthy western suburbs. In Paris, Mayor Chirac suggested dismantling on-street parking in order to increase road capacity for car traffic. Right-of-way bus lanes were introduced, together with some cycling lanes.



Small-scale, transformative, municipal initiatives promoting alternatives to motorized transportation only emerged in the region towards the end of the period. The first urban tramway line opened in 1992 outside Paris, in the heart of the red belt and against transport companies' preferences. It was soon followed by new tram projects. Following the 1995 general strike, users turned to cycling and car sharing, unexpectedly demonstrating to policymakers and technicians that transport alternatives could be encouraged across the region. In Paris, air pollution peaks created a new momentum for alternative solutions, such as car-free initiatives, weekly traffic bans on expressways alongside the Seine river, and the Quartiers Tranquilles initiative (reducing traffic speed and car access in designated areas). By contrast, the State-designed 1994 regional planning document proposed developing additional economic centres and new towns further away in outer suburbs, in connection with the speed rail network. New motorways were developed.

Towards sustainable mobility (1998-2011): institutional competition and enhanced policy capacities as major drivers for change

Regional sprawl, socio-spatial inequalities and increasing transport demand were still priorities to tackle. The functional metropolitan area spread beyond the region's boarders and demographic growth was strongest in the outer suburbs, and only partially absorbed by new towns. By 2000, only 25% of workplaces were located in Paris, as opposed to over 35% before 1975; a ¼ of the economically active population worked and lived in the same municipality.

With the election of a Left-Green majority across levels of government, state elites and transport professionals were challenged in their ability to set transport planning principles. Transport became a highly politicized issue, with each level struggling against one another in order to champion its preferred solution and preventing joint initiatives. Despite fragmentation, transport policies evolved rapidly, with institutional competition emerging as a major driver for policy change.

Paris takes the lead.

The new administration tapped into urban regeneration resources and environmental protection in order to introduce alternatives to car-based mobility, strengthen local public transport and enhance the quality of public spaces, first with the introduction of the urban tramway. Traffic calming, pedestrianizing (e.g., the Montorgueil area) and car-free initiatives (Paris Plage) were introduced citywide. This laid the ground for ambitious policy goals by 2030 (Mobility plan, 2007): reduced the share of individual car use by 40%, and achieved a 20% increase in public transport capacity. The overall impact was not immediate due to various resistances but allowed the progressive inclusion of many new policy initiatives into a long-term agenda for change. Efforts primarily drew on street-design initiatives: right-ofway bus lanes, cycling paths, space for walking and reducing roadspace allocated to cars. Speed limits were introduced (Quartiers verts), the urban tramway extended. Bike- and car-sharing systems were developed as part of public-private partnerships, soon extending towards the region's inner suburbs. Electric mobility is being encouraged, and ride-sharing is tolerated as a timely solution to travel demand at night. Over time the city accumulated knowledge, policy capacities and legitimacy, asserting its leadership through transportation. It now takes every opportunity to showcase the transformative role of urban transport.

Building capacity for change in the region.

During negotiations with the State, public transport was the new administration's priority. Taking responsibility over the public

transport authority (STIF) and strategic planning (SDRIF), it focused on streamlining public transport supply across the region as part of a new generation of bilateral network operation contracts. Increased tax rates on businesses were introduced region-wide. Bus services were improved (extended time slots, bus priority, higher frequencies, right-of-way lanes), the urban tramway and the Parisian metro were extended in the inner suburbs. Significant efforts were made to provide region-wide travel information, change the tariff policy, and install new ticketing systems. In doing so, the Region not only pushed back against state imposition of spatial and transport planning agendas but also against municipalities, including the powerful City of Paris.

This lack of cooperation caused delays or the abandonment of regional initiatives. This particularly impacted proposals aimed at modernizing the RER and regional train networks, due to state elites' reluctance in acknowledging STIF's authority and to continued RATP-SNCF rivalry. In its draft 2007 strategic plan, the region advocated a "planning for people" approach to regional mobility, committed to reduce socio-spatial inequalities resulting from the mismatch between public transport supply, affordable housing and commercial areas, and highlighted the urgency to modernize ageing networks (Transport investment programme).



"All against Sarkozy": unprecedented levels of institutional cooperation in the region

The Region's "planning for people" approach opposed the State's vision of the region as national hub, championed by President Sarkozy as part of the Grand Paris Express initiative. This initiative focused on rapid-transit connections between business districts, airports and innovation clusters to enhance regional attractiveness. As the State vetoed the region's plan (2007-2011), local authorities rallied up against the State. Demonstrating unprecedented support to the regional sustainable transportation agenda, municipalities worked with STIF and RATP on a case-by case basis, tapping into alternative funding sources (e.g., urban regeneration & climate change policy resources, EU, private initiatives, etc.) in order to develop transport alternatives to car, including cycling, car-sharing, public transport, and enhance the quality of public spaces through urban design initiatives. In public transport, rail-based initiatives were favoured in the densest urban areas as opposed to bus services between and outside urban cores

In 2011 a compromise was found: in addition to a revised version of the Grand Paris Express, the State agreed to co-fund the regional transport investment programme. A new state-led transport authority, Société du Grand Paris (SGP)¹, was created in order to coordinate new capacity investments in the region.

Current and future challenges

A shift away from the automobile-based city undoubtedly took place in the Paris Île-de-France region over the past five decades. Policy developments show constant overlap between three different transport policy types. In spite of limited demographic growth — estimates of 0,8 to 1,8 million additional inhabitants by 2030 – diffuse urban sprawl has not been contained and now spreads beyond the regional boarders. Car dependency is still increasing rapidly in the outer suburbs, whereas car use reduction took place in Paris and the inner suburbs, where investments and capacity building have been most pronounced.

Following four decades of decentralization reforms, each institutional level now has sufficient resources to champion its own policy priorities and preferred solutions, while seeking increased autonomy and policy capacities through aggressive place-making strategies. Paradoxically, and in spite of such major achievements, levels of authority still compete and clash in most policy areas. The City of Paris' decision to reduce car traffic by reallocating emblematic roads to other uses reopened a major institutional struggle in a changed political context and confirmed continued support outside Paris for car use in the region in the name of spatial justice, freedom of choice and accessibility. The lack of coordination between major stakeholders led to recurring infrastructural crises in the RER and regional train networks, further highlighting the need for massive investments. The State capacity was confirmed with the Grand Paris Express initiative, although the nature of its power has changed overtime.

From a public policy and a governance perspective, the main **challenges** are **institutional** – to ensure stabilized forms of coordination beyond political competition –, **organizational** – to ensure coordination between transport modes region-wide – and **financial** – to find a new compromise about financing new transport investments and optimizing existing networks.

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NB. Technical note n°5 introduces the analytical framework and the methodology for this study.

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THIS SUMMARY IS BASED ON:

D4.2. TECHNICAL REPORT FOR STAGE 3 CITY: PARIS ÎLE-DE-FRANCE (SEPTEMBER, 2017),

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